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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 14710 
DON C. COFFEY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
---0000000---
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a criminal case in which ~he Appellant was 
convicted of issuing a bad check in violation of 
§76-6-505, Utah Criminal Code. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On May 24, 1976, the Defendant-Appellant was tried 
to a jury before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen and found 
guilty of a second degree felony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Don c. Coffey, seeks a vacation of the jury 
verdict and a judgment of not guilty notwithstanding the 
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verdict of the jury, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant-Appellant, Don c. Coffey, at the time 
of the alleged offense was in the business of buying, 
transporting, and selling fruit. On July 29, 1975 he 
contacted one Morris Ercanbrack, a fruit grower. The 
Defendant and Mr. Ercanbrack negotiated, Mr. Ercanbrack 
gave the Defendant a truckload of cherries, and the 
Defendant gave ~.r. Ercanbrack a check in the amount of 
$3,560.00 drawn on the Dixie State Bank, St. George, 
Utah. 
The check was presented for payment and was dis-
honored. The Defendant did not have sufficient funds 
or credit with Dixie State Bank for payment of the 
check. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CLOSE OF EVIDENCE WAS ERROR BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED 
TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THE DEFENDANT'S INTENT 
TO DEFRAUD WHEN IT OFFERED NO EVIDENCE ON THE POINT. 
The state offered two witnesses who testified that 
the Defendant issued a check to Morris Ercanbrack in 
the amount of $3,560.00 drawn on the Dixie State Bank, 
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St. George, Utah, in payment for a truckload of cherries. 
It was stipulated that at the time the check was issued, 
the Defendant did not have sufficient funds or credit 
with the bank to pay the check. 
§76-20-11, U.C.A. 1953 said that the making of a 
check at a time when the maker has insufficient funds to 
pay the check is prima facie evidence of intent to 
defraud. §76-6-505 of the Utah Criminal Code replaced 
§76-20-11. §76-6-505 is silent on what constitutes 
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. That change 
implies that the legislature intended to remove any 
presumption which arises from the mere making of a 
check without sufficient funds. 
In State v. Bruce 1 U.2d 136, i62 P.2d 960(1953), 
a case decided under the old section,· this Court 
reviewed evidence which would bear on the Defendant's 
intent. Certainly, under the new section, some evidence 
should be required. Such evidence is required in other 
jurisdictions. See People v. Griffith, 120 C.A.2d 873, 
262 P.2d 355. 
In the instant case there was no evidence what-
soever concerning the Defendant's standing with the 
bank, whether any check had ever been previously 
dishonored, if other checks were issued on or around 
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the same day, how long Mr. Coffey had been dealing with 
the bank, or whether or not the particular check was 
dishonored because of an insufficiency of funds amount-
ing to $1.00 or to $3,500.00. No evidence was brought 
forth to establish the requisite intent except that 
the check, in a normal commercial setting, was issued 
and was subsequently dishonored. 
Based upon the State's failure to offer evidence 
of intent to defraud, the Defendant's motion to dismiss 
at the close of evidence should have been granted. 
See Kunkel v. Estes, 346 P.2d 185 (Oklahoma 1959). 
POINT II 
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CLOSE OF EVIDENCE WAS ERROR BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED 
TO MEET ITS STATUTORY BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT KNEW THAT THE CHECK WOULD NOT BE PAID. 
The statute which the Defendant is charged with 
violating provides that the Defendant, to be guilty, 
must know when he issues the check that it will not 
be paid by the bank. §76-6-505(1) Utah Criminal Code. 
The only evidence on this point in the record is the 
statements by both prosecution witnesses that they 
had been told by the Defendant that the check was good. 
This evidence, though minimally probative, indicates 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l 
the Defendant's belief that the check would be paid. 
It cannot be seriously argued that the Defendant's 
knowledge should be presumed or implied. The statute 
under which the Defendant is charged provided that 
knowledge will be presumed when the Defendant has no 
account but establishes no presumption in any other 
case. §76-6-505(2) Utah Criminal Code. The well 
established doctrine of inclusio unius ~ exclusio 
alterius requires that the statute be interpreted as 
eliminating the presumption of knowledge e1'Cept as 
specified. Hansen v. Board of Education, lOl Ut. 15, 
116 P.2d 936 (1941). State v. Driscoll, 101 Mont. 
348, 54 P.2d 571. 
This Court in State v. Bruce, supra, stated that 
conditions of the mind, including, pre~wnably, know-
ledge, were capable of proof. In the instant case, 
as previously stated, there was no evidence whatsoever 
concerning the Defendant's standing with the bank, 
whether any check had ever been previously dishonored, 
if other checks were issued on or around the same d~y, 
how long Mr. Coffey had been dealing with the bank, or 
whether or not the particular check was dishonored 
because of an insufficiency of funds amounting to 
$1.00 or to $3,500.00. No evidence was brought forth 
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to establish the requisite knowledge except that the 
check, in a normal commercial setting, was issued and 
was subsequently dishonored. 
Based upon the State's failure to offer any 
evidence as to the Defendant's knowledge, the Defen-
dant's motion to dismiss at the close of evidence 
should have been granted. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE 
DEFENDANT IN NOT FULLY, FAIRLY, AND CORRECTLY 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME. 
As noted previously, the statute under which 
the Defendant was charged made the issuance of a 
check a crime only if the Defendant knew he had no 
sufficient funds or credit. The Defendant's knowledge 
is an important and essential element of the offense. 
In the jury instructions given at trial, instruc-
tion number 5 purports to list the essential elements 
of the crime. Nowhere in instruction number 5 is the 
jury advised that knowledge is an element of the 
offense. The instruction goes on to say that if the 
jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of "all 
of the essential elements of the offense as above-set 
forth, the Defendant is guilty ... " (emphasis added)· 
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The instruction challenged clearly tells the jury 
that they must find the Defendant guilty, even though 
the Defendant is without knowledge, if the other ele-
ments have been proved. 
Instructing the jury with instruction number 5 
was error which could not fail to prejudice the Defen-
dant. The trial court must fully instruct the jury 
on all essential elements of a crime. See State v. 
Clingerman, 516 P.2d 1022, 213 Kan. 525 (l!t73), 
Thomas v. State, 522 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1974). 
The trial court goes on, in instruction number &, 
to seemingly offer the jury an alternate ground fer 
finding the Defendant guilty. Instruction number &1 
set forth in its entirety, states: 
Any person who issues or passes a check for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person any money, pro- '· 
perty or thing of value knowing it will not be paid 
by the drawee bank and payment is refused by the 
drawee bank is guilty of issuing a bad check. 
Instruction number 6 clearly tells the jury that: 
they might find the Defendant guilty without regard 
to his 'intent to defraud, without regard to the amount 
of the check, without regard to why payment is refused, 
and without regard to whether the Defendant had 
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sufficient funds or credit. This, again, was preju-
dicial error. See State v. Clingerman, supra. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFEN-
D~..NT IN OFFERING INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE CONFUSING AND 
CONTRADICTORY. 
As previously discussed, instructions 5 and 6 
were erroneous in that they instructed the jury to 
find the Defendant guilty without one or another 
essential elements. Instructions 5 and 6 are also 
confusing and contradictory. Each instruction pur-
ports to set forth the conditions under which the 
jury must find the Defendant guilty. Each is seem-
ingly a complete standard in itself. 
The offering of separate, differing standards of 
guilt is inevitably confusing to a lay jury and is 
prejudicial error. State v. Hendricks, 258 P.2d 452 
123 Ut 267. 
It is not the function of an appeal to weigh 
evidence. Nonetheless, a result which is completely 
unsupported by evidence cannot stand. Kunkel v. 
~· 346 P.2d 185 (Oklahoma 1959). For that reason 
the judgment below should be reversed and Defendant's 
motion to dismiss granted. Further, the trial court's 
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instructions to the jury were prejudicial and would 
entitle the Defendant to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JOHN G. MULLINER 
MULLINER & MCCULLOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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